cucumovirus

Maybe it's just a matter of language and not an actual philosophical difference, but I think there is still a philosophical difference.

There is no “self” beyond the material world as the dominant mode of thought assumes.

I agree, but I still think you're making the mistake I'm trying to caution against in the sentence prior:

Yes, wills and consciousness exist, my point is that they are illusory in so far as “we” think we have “control.”

They are not illusory, they are material. And while the dominant mode of thought might assume we have more control than we actually do, it doesn't mean we don't have any control. We or our "self", that is entirely part of the material world, does have a certain amount of control because it is a part of that same material world. This control isn't separated from the material world, but a part of it. Your sentence here still sounds like only the material world has "control" and it exerts it upon us from outside, which would imply that we are different from the rest of matter, but in the opposite direction of the idealist free will notion.

I think that in your correct impulse to combat the idealist narratives prevalent today, you go too far in the opposite direction. Similar to how Plekhanov describes here:

No amount of patching was of any use, and one after another thinking people began to reject subjectivism as an obviously and utterly unsound doctrine. As always happens in such cases, however, the reaction against this doctrine caused some of its opponents to go to the opposite extreme. While some subjectivists, striving to ascribe the widest possible role to the “individual” in history, refused to recognise the historical progress of mankind as a process expressing laws, some of their later opponents, striving to bring out more sharply the coherent character of this progress, were evidently prepared to forget that men make history, and therefore, the activities of individuals cannot help being important in history. They have declared the individual to be a quantité négligeable. In theory, this extreme is as impermissible as the one reached by the more ardent subjectivists. It is as unsound to sacrifice the thesis to the antithesis as to forget the antithesis for the sake of the thesis. The correct point of view will be found only when we succeed in uniting the points of truth contained in them into a synthesis.

The point isn't to disprove determinism, and definitely isn't to do so in favor of free will. The point is to achieve a dialectical materialist understanding as opposed to a mechanical one.

In your previous thread you say this about "sentience":

yeah, but what is it? how does it have free will? isn’t it just regular matter subject to conditions, not able to make decisions.

Firstly, I think there's some confusion about free will and will. Free will is an idealist notion that essentially our minds can operate above or outside of the laws of physics. That is clearly false. Just will, on the other hand, doesn't have idealist connotations. I think that's an error your interlocutor made in that thread, or a general error of not defining the terms discussed. An error I think you've made here and in general is opposing the two positions of mechanical determinism and free will in a dichotomy as the only possibilities.

I'm partial to @[email protected]'s thought about there being a category error. I think your mistake is in thinking that everything is infinitely reducible into smaller parts, and also without loss of context. In more general terms, I don't think you've fully grasped dialectics.

We know from dialectics that relational properties are very important, and abstracting things doesn't let us analyze them properly. I think you're missing a key concept of dialectics when you assume that the parts that make up the whole are ontologically primary and exist separately from the whole while still being the same parts that make it up. I mean this in the sense that different bits of matter make up us, so from their properties you assume it's clear that no will exists because atoms aren't sentient. Your mistake is in not recognizing that our sentience is a property of matter. Not of abstract matter in general, but of the specific organization of matter which results in us. You say "regular matter" as if some other kind of matter would need to exist for sentience to exist.

A simpler example can be made from the properties of water. A single molecule of water doesn't have surface tension. Following your mechanical model, we cannot really explain how water, when organized in a larger body, does. This is in general a fault of the Cartesian reductionist model which predominates in science today instead of dialectics. The concept which is usually used here is that of emergent properties, but it doesn't really explain anything by itself. Dialectics on the other hand doesn't even see a problem here to explain because a water molecule on its own and a water molecule in a larger body of water are two different things. The parts of the whole don't exist separately from that whole as its parts.

The properties of the whole and the individual parts of that whole don't exist separately from their interactions as parts of that whole. These properties only come into existence from the interactions of the parts and the whole. By simply studying individual water molecules, you would never discover surface tension. Parts interact with each other and with the whole, and the whole interacts with all the parts. A common example of this in Marxism are the base-superstructure relations. None of the components of either the base or the superstructure exist on their own, they are parts of the whole that is our society. The economic base tends to have a stronger influence on the superstructure, but the specific relations are constantly changing.

Here's a quote from Sayers' critique of mechanical materialism:

This is the dialectical account of history given by Marx, and it differs entirely from Cohen’s mechanical interpretation. The differences are clearly spelled out by Engels in the well known series of letters that he wrote towards the end of his life. In them he insists that the economic system and the superstructure are not simply the immediate and direct products of the prevailing form of production. Although their character is certainly conditioned predominantly by the development of the productive forces, it cannot be reduced to this factor alone. On the contrary, the economic system, for example, acquires its own distinctive character and its own inner dynamic. Through the division of labour, trade and commerce become areas of activity increasingly independent of production. They acquire, in short, a degree of “relative autonomy”.

Where there is division of labour on a social scale, there the different labour processes become independent of each other. In the last instance production is the decisive factor. But as soon as trade in products becomes independent of production proper, it follows a movement of its own, which, while it is governed as a whole by production, still in particular respects and within this general dependence follows laws of its own: this movement has phases of its own and in turn reacts on the movement of production.

The same is true, even more clearly, of political and legal institutions and of art, religion and philosophy. None is purely “functional” to the development of production. Each of these spheres, while in general being determined by the development of production and by economic forces, has its own relatively autonomous process of development, its own relative independence. Each affects the others and the material base.

Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all of these react upon one another and also upon the economic basis. It is not that the economic condition is the cause and alone active, while everything else is only a passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself.

Another way to put this is through the constancy of change in dialectics and the build up of quantitative change into qualitative leaps. You cannot simply "go down a level" of quality and look at the quantitative aspects of the lower level to understand everything in the higher. The surface tension example can again be used here.

Taking from all the points above, we are active parts of the whole, our societies, our history, and we have constant and mutual interactions with each other, with the other parts, and with the whole. Our wills and choices (still far from free) do matter here very much and we do make the choices. Our consciousness is a key part of the process of our history, as is also seen in the notion that freedom is the recognition of necessity. Therefore, to deny our conscious will (not free will, which is idealist) and its effects is a mistake, and akin to saying that water doesn't have the property of surface tension because an individual water molecule doesn't, or arguing that social constructs aren’t real.

This doesn't "disprove determinism" in general, and it doesn't seek to. It's just a proper contextualization of phenomena and processes. It does highlight the limitations and mistakes of mechanical determinism. Out of the specific interactions of the organizations of matter that make up us, come the properties of consciousness, thought, will, etc. Our will is simply a property of matter organized in a specific manner. There is no need to assume any metaphysics or idealism to describe our wills.

Another quote form Sayers to hopefully round this out:

Even in the realm of purely inorganic, physical phenomena, the mechanical view is an abstract and metaphysical one. It portrays physical objects in an idealised fashion, as unaffected by their relations.

[...]

Of course, the mechanical outlook has played an extremely important role in the development of the scientific understanding of nature, and it is not my intention to reject such methods and assumptions altogether. The error comes when such methods and assumptions are made into a universal philosophy and emphasised in an exclusive and one-sided fashion. Their abstract character is forgotten and they are employed as though they alone formed an adequate basis for understanding reality. The result is an abstract and metaphysical view of the world.

I'm not saying we have free will, or that our choices aren't materially and socially determined, I'm saying that we still do make those choices, and I'm cautioning against mechanical materialism that turns into pessimistic or nihilistic fatalism. We are parts of the whole, and we are conscious of it. We are active parts of the historical process and our history happens through our actions. Do you dispute Marx's framing I quoted above?

Just to preface this, I'm not arguing against the critique of the reactionary position in this meme, but speaking more generally and trying to round out understanding of the whole philosophical argument. We clearly know that the idealist free will position is inaccurate, but the mechanical determinist position doesn't give us the full picture either.

While our lives are shaped by our material conditions, we should always keep dialectical materialism in mind and not fall into a purely mechanical determinism that becomes a pessimistic or nihilistic fatalism.

From Gramsci:

We can observe how the determinist, fatalist mechanist element has been an immediate ideological “aroma” of Marxism, a form of religion and of stimulation (but like a drug necessitated and historically justified by the “subordinate” character of certain social strata).

When one does not have the initiative in the struggle and the struggle itself is ultimately identified with a series of defeats, mechanical determinism becomes a formidable power of moral resistance, of patient and obstinate perseverance. “I am defeated for the moment but the nature of things is on my side over a long period,” etc. Real will is disguised as an act of faith, a sure rationality of history, a primitive and empirical form of impassioned finalism which appears as a substitute for the predestination, providence, etc., of the confessional religions. We must insist on the fact that even in such a case there exists in reality a strong active will, a direct influence on the “nature of things,” but it is certainly in an implicit and veiled form, ashamed of itself, and so the consciousness of it is contradictory, lacks critical unity, etc. But when the “subordinate” becomes the leader and is responsible for the economic activity of the mass, mechanicalism appears at a certain moment as an imminent danger, there occurs a revision of the whole mode of thinking because there has taken place a change in the social mode of being.

We should always keep in mind that, despite the limitations imposed on us by material conditions and history, we are parts of the whole and not just passive entities being directed by outside forces. Our actions and choices, especially collective ones, do matter and are what shapes our societies.

As Marx puts it:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.

Also: https://redsails.org/the-pitfalls-of-liberalism/

The most perturbing question for the liberal is the question of violence. The liberal’s initial reaction to violence is to try to convince the oppressed that violence is an incorrect tactic, that violence will not work, that violence never accomplishes anything.

The liberal is so preoccupied with stopping confrontation that he usually finds himself defending and calling for law and order, the law and order of the oppressor. Confrontation would disrupt the smooth functioning of the society and so the politics of the liberal leads him into a position where he finds himself politically aligned with the oppressor rather than with the oppressed.

The reason the liberal seeks to stop confrontation — and this is the second pitfall of liberalism — is that his role, regardless of what he says, is really to maintain the status quo, rather than to change it.

Because many of them don't actually support Palestinian liberation, and are, as you suggest, still holding on to their liberalism even if they claim not to. Their support manifests only in an empty verbal declaration without any actual understanding.

Take a look at this article which illustrates and analyzes the problem well. An excerpt:

Some people understand being in favour of something as a kind of thought act: it happens in one fell swoop in the realm of intentions, and it can be verified by a simple declaration of support. It is enough for me to declare I’m in favour of, for example, abolishing the patriarchy, or capitalism, for these people to believe me. But what if I’m in favour of a general objective and at the same time opposed to every specific step needed to achieve it? Let us start by imagining how this contradiction might play out in the context of a simpler problem than patriarchy or capitalism: water is leaking through a hole in my roof. I am in favor of the overall goal of stopping the leak, but I insist on some strange rules. For instance, I decide that only supernatural beings can handle the problem. Or I forbid anyone from walking on the roof while fixing the leak. Or people may walk on my roof, but I demand that they refrain from using ladders or any other tool to get up there. Or they may use a ladder, but only after climbing onto the roof, never before. So long as I am imposing such conditions, what does it matter that I profess my desire to solve the problem? No matter how much I see myself as enemy number one of the leak, in practice I am actually in favour of keeping it around. Therefore, just saying that I’m in favour of a given objective is not enough. My declarations carry weight only when I support them with a thorough understanding of the steps needed to reach that objective and when I allow these steps to be executed in the necessary order.

As far as I can tell, the only thing Hakim is saying, is that it is important to consider Islamic influence on current Palestinian struggle.

But he isn't saying this, he's saying that it's religion that's driving the anti-colonial struggle.

their unshakable faith, which drives their anti-colonial struggle.

And then he proceeds to give a list of religious texts to read in order for us to learn about the persistence of Palestinian resistance.

This is a blatantly idealist analysis of the situation in Palestine. Again, no one is saying we need to ignore or even actively reject the influence of religion to the struggle, but it's simply not correct that religion is driving the struggle. He offers no materialist analysis and no sources to learn about settler-colonialism or the history of Palestine and its resistance.

The problem with this is that he positions himself as a Marxist educator, but in this post he's being an idealist.

He also says this is the "largest missing context" in regards to the Palestinian struggle, but that's also not true. A lot more people are thinking about this in religious terms, than as an anti-colonial struggle against zionist settler-colonialism and the wider context of western imperialism - which it is in reality.

You claim he's just trying to highlight Islamic influence on the current struggle, but his wording is not consistent with this. His post is idealist and not materialist.

For your take of the post to be true we would have to assume his intentions and say he didn't communicate clearly enough. If we just read what he wrote, it cannot be considered something a Marxist-Leninist educator should be saying.

I agree that many western countries have a christian culture, but would reading the bible really help you understand our modern society, especially more than reading some Marxist theory?

It just feels like you and almost everyone else defending Hakim's post are trying to find a meaning in his words that just isn't there if you read them directly, a meaning that you find acceptable and compatible with Marxism, but not one that can be read from the actual words he used.

In pretty much every post here and on hexbear that's defending Hakim's post I see at least one of a few assumptions taken as true which aren't.

Firstly, no one here is criticizing the Palestinian resistance and the forms it takes. We're criticizing Hakim's post. Hakim has positioned himself as a Marxist educator and taken on the role of spreading ML theory. With this come some responsibilities, namely to share actual Marxist analysis. When he departs from this, he'll get rightly criticized for it.

He can be religious and do what he wants. No one is criticizing the fact that he's religious. We're criticizing the fact that he brands himself a Marxist educator with Lenin as his picture and then shares idealist analysis like in this post.

Secondly, that his analysis is not idealist, when it really is. This has nothing to do with Islam specifically, it would be true of any religion, but stating that a religion is what's driving resistance is simply idealist. As Marxists we know that it's the material conditions that are the primary drivers of both the zionist settler-colonialism and Palestinian resistance. We, of course, don't neglect the superstructural aspects, with ideology and religion among them, but we don't make them the primary drivers of resistance. We begin with the material.

There have been similar resistance movements throughout history, some religious and some not which have persisted just like the Palestinian movement. As Marxists we understand why that is, and that, while in each particular case the particular ideology had an impact, ideology as such is not the driving force behind revolution.

As Amílcar Cabral said

always bear in mind that people are not fighting for ideas, for things in anyone's head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better lives and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children.

What we (Marxists-Leninists) should be spreading are works through which you can learn about settler-colonialism and resistance to it in general, and works about the specific conditions of Palestine. No one's even saying we should totally ignore religion, but it cannot form the basis of our analysis, and we cannot center it above the material.

An example of a better (in my opinion) post about Palestinian resistance right now is this thread by Roderic Day.

Also, as Marxists, critique is what we do. No one is beyond critique, and especially not our fellow comrades. Such critique and discussion is how we arrive at correct theory (and practice) and consolidate around it.

The claim that a triumphant will is all it takes to overcome it

No, the claim is that people have enough knowledge and access to information that they can debunk any piece of propaganda they see, but they make the rational choice not to and instead go along with it. This choice is not some free will idealistic choice, it happens due to the material conditions in which the people live and the social purpose of propaganda which lets them easily justify their dominant global position as a westerner. The point is that they don't have an actual excuse for "believing" propaganda, but that they go along with it mostly because they want to keep their privilege (or see it as a way to get some), even though on some level they know it's a bad thing.

I agree generally, especially in terms of material gain to these people and potential reparations, but I also think that personal guilt should be determined on a case by case basis. However, every racist white westerner screaming about Hamas terrorists right now, when plenty of people are sharing actual correct information, is definitely complicit and is purposefully ignoring the evidence he is being given. Similarly, the outrageous stories about the DPRK that are circulated by the various CIA outlets or Yeonmi Park are simply too ridiculous for anyone to actually believe and take seriously, yet until recently people mostly shared them with glee. People go along with them due to other reasons, not an actual belief. Stories about Xinjiang are also not shared because people actually care and tried to inform themselves about the situation, but only due to (real or perceived) material gain (or even just emotional satisfaction) that the people sharing them get.

that propaganda has zero effect on people exposed to it

That is not the claim, no one has ever claimed this. Propaganda definitely has an effect, but the way it works is different and specific, and it's possible to fight against it. Have you read the article I linked?

Again, I didn’t talk about brainwashing nor do I believe in the brainwashing theory you keep attributing to me

But you did explicitly mention, in your second comment, this:

My point is that propaganda can influence us in subtle ways that don’t have to be complete “brainwashing,” and the belief that because you are (presumably) not “brainwashed” that you have completely escaped propaganda’s influence is dangerously presumptive.

implying that "brainwashing" can exist at least in some limited fashion. You framed your critique only in regard to brainwashing and not the actual theory I'm a proponent of (the article explicitly deals with such points and proposes how to fight them). The point is that the way propaganda works is not by some invisible ever-present influence, but by socially licensing us to go along with certain things. In the same manner marketing and advertising work as well (the ads that don't simply reveal to us use-value of a necessary products, but those that attempt to create a specific brand image).

I said that the things we expose ourselves to have some influence over what we think and believe, and by extension our actions

This claim no one disagrees with, but that is not the same claim you made before. The point is that we rationally choose what we interact with and what we believe, and both of those things are underpinned by our material conditions, but it is possible to rationally make a choice against the prevailing default narrative in society.

You didn't mention the term, but if your notion of propaganda is something that can just infect you without warning, then it's not really in line with the scientific views of propaganda and it's much closer to the brainwashing theory. If you just scrolled reddit or listened to a Jordan Peterson lecture every day, would you really be in danger of becoming an anti-communist because of it?

The point is to reject completely any "brainwashing" theories, even if in quotes, because they are unscientific and don't really explain anything. It's about recognizing that people buy into propaganda for specific reasons, exploring those reasons, and about formulating effective strategies to get them to "buy out" if possible. It's about actively rejecting said propaganda and getting people to do the same.