“focused discussion”…right
YouKnowWhoTheFuckIAM
joined 1 year ago
100% agreed, what terrifies me is that our friend here seems to see the word “science” in here and immediately assume impeccable faith and perfect knowledge
If I may refer you back to the book cited, the (made up) fears of that time in fact incorporated the difficulty of obtaining fissile material during that period, when amongst the worries was that obtaining fissile material would not actually be that difficult. To simply state that biological and chemical warfare bear no resemblance is to depart from the lesson being related here to making excuses for that object of which you happen to be afraid. In each case the fear being constructed will make its own allowances for the real or supposed facts on the ground, and in this case there was no need to assume that a bombmaker would have to make his own plutonium - you’re drawing attention to an irrelevant distraction.
Another point which you’re glibly avoiding, with tellingly unnecessary recourse to insulting language, is that “CBRN” the construct cannot be so easily distinguished from the “practical and technical application” that the real enterprise has. Indeed the existence of the real enterprise is often driven in part by the made-up fears (which does not licence the fears) - this happened, for example, with security protocols around the management of fissile material. I refer you back to the same book and to the rather famous data point about Bill Clinton’s interest in manufactured diseases.
For more on stuff like this, although again not on the subject of bioterrorism because I don’t have that material in front of me, I recommend the confluence of two chapters in The Merger of Knowledge with Power by Rabitz (as well as the whole book), namely “Recombinant DNA Research: Whose Risks?” and “Hardware and Fantasy in Military Technology”. This isn’t paranoid soapboxing from a teenage Chomsky fan, it’s just part of the fabric of industrial science and technology as a social phenomenon.
I expressly put “CBRN groups” in scare quotes to tag along with my line at the bottom “I don’t want to be dismissive of genuine attempts…but the scale and scope of this is defined by politics, not by technical possibility”
You, however, have me saying “cbrn is made up to self justify” - of course if I had said any such thing, then one counter-example would have sufficed. Although actually it wouldn’t have sufficed, because in this context we’re talking about terroristic or otherwise chaotic release of a novel weapon. We’re not talking at all about bad powerful people deliberately employing chemical weapons they already have, for which of course CBRN is a worthy use and “genuine attempt at being ready”.
“CBRN groups”, here, operates at the level of rhetoric, and that’s what I tried to draw attention to. The context in which “CBRN groups” the rhetorical and political device emerged was that in which Bill Clinton could become so enthused by a sci-fi novel about bioterrorism that he had its author up in front of the senate testifying as an expert on the subject. So on reflection, I should have deferred to Eisenhower’s original formulation: the military-industrial-congressional complex.
Edit: you could always try Alex Wellerstein for the aggressively obvious historical counter-point to this whole fantasy. In his Restricted Data he provides a useful companion to Barriers to Bioweapons in a chapter discussing the notorious “backyard atomic bomb built from declassified material” cases. But because it’s a work of history we learn the most salient fact of all: the only way anyone believed that the backyard bomb designs were viable was because somebody wanted them to believe it, or because they had some reason to want to believe it themselves.
Without that ingredient it was plain that the actual know-how was just not there, however that fact was fundamentally obscured by the desire to believe, and so people saw viability where there was none: plugging holes in their imaginary with meaningless verbiage about risk and but-what-if?
I think what’s going miss here is that “CBRN groups” is very obviously and primarily shit made up by the military-industrial complex to justify itself after the Cold War
I don’t want to be dismissive of genuine attempts at being ready just in case, but the scale and scope of this is defined by politics, not by technical possibility
Too late! You already mean “moronarchy”
To be clear: it is all movie plot threats. At the very forefront of the entire “existential threat” space is nothing but a mid-1990s VHS library. Frankly if you want to understand like 50% of what goes on in AI at this point my recommendation is just that you read John Ganz and listen to his podcast, because 90s pop and politics culture is the connective tissue of the whole fucking enterprise.
The great philosophical dialogues in English - those by Berkeley, Hume, Lakatos - are few and far between. Perhaps there is a general awareness that only these exceptional stylists could pull off the rare trick of not obviously putting words into their antagonist’s mouths, even insofar as the author clearly took the view of his protagonist. Indeed there is still, two and a half centuries later, debate about whose view in his own dialogue Hume actually took - when the rather obvious and straightforward alternative was just writing down “this is what I fucking think, alright?” that aporetic flourish was precisely what justified writing it down in dialogue form in the first place.
or confusing GWAS’ current inability to detect a gene with the gene not existing
This remarkable sleight of hand sticks out. The argument from the (or rather this particular) GWAS camp goes “we are detecting the genes, contrary to expectations”. There isn’t any positive assumption in favour of that camp, so failure to thus far detect the gene is supposed to motivate against its existence.
I like the implication that if LLMs are, as we all know to be true, near perfect models of human cognition, human behaviour of all sorts of kinds turns out to be irreducibly social, even behaviour that appears to be “fixed” from an early stage
Look, if you want to understand where I’m coming from, I can give you - at a glance - the two sources I’ve already given: Alex Wellerstein Unrestricted Data and J.R. Ravetz “The Merger of Knowledge with Power”, specifically the two chapters cited (the Wellerstein chapter is “Unrestricted Data: New Challenges to the Cold War Secrecy Regime”. I would also urge you to check out Lisa Stampnitzky Disciplining Terror. The introduction to the Ravetz book is also a must-read, not just for this, but also for a general understanding of how scientific research at the industrial level serves political and sectoral interests of all kinds - this is not radical pamphleteering about “the politics of politicians” but real empirical work about the real conditions under which science is done.
Stampnitzky is extremely useful here for understanding how the word “terrorist” (or similar) functions in the sorts of papers you cite at the very top. “Terrorist” and “state actor” are political words, and the risks (supposedly) measured which are attached to the threats you describe are weighted by those words, not by the scientific words pertaining to technical capability. To say that “terrorists” might get hold of this or that technology is to say that a particular type of person (who may or may not exist) will get hold of that technical capacity and make use of it.
The point is, in fact, that technical capacity has almost nothing to do with the measurement of risk from terrorist acquisition of that technical capacity. The measurement of risk is locused pretty much exclusively around the type of person who poses a threat. That type of person is a construction of politics, not a scientifically neutral object term in which people with medical or physical science qualifications have any expertise whatsoever.
To put it extremely briefly, this means that when you come across papers by CBRN professionals assessing speculative risks, much of the work being done is being done at the behest of political projects which have their home in the defense industry, not in assessment of the mere technical capacities available to people at large. As we learn from Ravetz, speculative risk created such an enormous bubble during the Cold War that it is almost impossible to take those measured risks remotely seriously - and as we learn from Stampnitzky, the idea of a “terrorist” has been constructed in such a way as to fuel that bubble. This means that CBRN professionals, however unimpeachable their contributions to the amelioration of those occasional disasters which do actually happen, are thoroughly questionable as unbiased witnesses to the scale that risks at large present.
Because, as your own inconsistencies show, you are not having a focused discussion (for example: you angrily claim in your second reply that in your first you asked me to expand on an earlier point, even though this never actually happened) it is extremely difficult to get this point across without appearing to just be dismissive of technical capacity as a factor. But in fact technical capacity has been factored in to my discussion this entire time. The fact that you’re unaware of the political environment in which your (non-)fear finds its sources is not anybody’s fault, but it is your fault if you don’t even acknowledge that other people might have a clearer idea about how this stuff works.