Privacy

I thought it was open source.

https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server

This doesn't prevent them from running different software or logging requests, but we have unsealed court orders, which is better than most other services that could receive them.

It is, but open source servers never matter anyways

The server is Foss. However, that means nothing as you still be using it. Best to not trust it and use ee2e which is what Signal does.

Signal is really a fancy version of SMS and MMS. It does require a phone number but contacts don't need that you contact you. There are better options from a anonymity perspective but they aren't as user friendly and popular.

Then not to be aggressive about it, but go get qualified or stop spreading FUD honestly...

As you said, if PFS can be disabled by enabling a feature on the receiving end it's by security practices not enabled, in the industry that's called a downgrade attack and considered very bad practice.

The blog post you linked, is the publicly revised version after they were called out by well known cryptographers for their handling. This was their original response to the researchers, again after the researchers disclosed the vulnerabilities to them and actively helped designing the new protocol, not just giving inspiration. This was their initial tweet: „There’s a new paper on Threema’s old communication protocol. Apparently, today’s academia forces researchers and even students to hopelessly oversell their findings“ which is long deleted, but I did read it while it was still up back then. I can't find a screenshot or anything at the moment, so if you want to call me a liar, go ahead but if you search for that quote you will find many citations.

Also, they claimed „old protocol“ but Ibex was still months from being deployed widespread, so that's another big downplay.

You mention Signals Desktop app issue, Threema claimed the attacks were unrealistic because they require significant computing power or social engineering, both things that are definitely a risk if you're trying to protect yourself from bigger intelligence efforts. The issue with Signal Desktop however, required full file system access to your device at which point, there is nothing stopping the attacker from simply using a key logger, capturing your screen, etc.

This is why no big security researchers called out Signal but many shunned Threema. At the end I don't have a horse in the race for either of them, but I think those are facts people need when making a decision with their private information.

I'm copying my other response since you both had the same issue with my statements:

As you said, if PFS can be disabled by enabling a feature on the receiving end it's by security practices not enabled, in the industry that's called a downgrade attack and considered very bad practice.

The blog post you linked, is the publicly revised version after they were called out by well known cryptographers for their handling. This was their original response to the researchers, again after the researchers disclosed the vulnerabilities to them and actively helped designing the new protocol, not just giving inspiration. This was their initial tweet: „There’s a new paper on Threema’s old communication protocol. Apparently, today’s academia forces researchers and even students to hopelessly oversell their findings“ which is long deleted, but I did read it while it was still up back then. I can't find a screenshot or anything at the moment, so if you want to call me a liar, go ahead but if you search for that quote you will find many citations.

Also, they claimed „old protocol“ but Ibex was still months from being deployed widespread, so that's another big downplay.

You mention Signals Desktop app issue, Threema claimed the attacks were unrealistic because they require significant computing power or social engineering, both things that are definitely a risk if you're trying to protect yourself from bigger intelligence efforts. The issue with Signal Desktop however, required full file system access to your device at which point, there is nothing stopping the attacker from simply using a key logger, capturing your screen, etc.

This is why no big security researchers called out Signal but many shunned Threema. At the end I don't have a horse in the race for either of them, but I think those are facts people need when making a decision with their private information.

I almost think that’s a pro. I don’t understand how signal intends to pay for servers forever with voluntary donations.

In the same vein, a privately owned service, to me, is rather suspect if it is free of cost — the money's gotta come from somewhere.

Is that an "agree" as in you hadn't considered what I said, or that you agree to that in addition? If it was the latter, I should clarify that I wasn't adding supplementary information — I was outlining what I thought was a flaw in your rationale (eg argument from ignorance) for distrust in Signal.

But I’d also view a singular commercial company’s no-cost product as not being a long term bet on privacy/anonymity.

Oh I completely agree with the idea that a federated service, like Matrix ^[1]^, is far preferable to a centralized one, eg Discord ^[2]^; I have no issue with using Matrix (I personally use it extensively) I just think one should be careful with the idea of using it with the intent of being anonymous.

Aha, thanks, just wondering. English isn't my first language.