That was addressed above, you ever see "identical" twins? They look exactly the same if you see then once, twice, 3 times, but if you see both of them constantly, you'll start seeing the small difference in them and then be able to identify who's who. Same exact thing.

I don't think there is any proven results, but I think the reason the EFF prefers Braves decision is the philosophy that there are so many data points that it could be possible to link you to it using the ones not standardized by anti fingerprinting.

Like ways to incorrectly describe someone. One describes a guy correctly but generically. One describes a guy with a lot of detail but the wrong race and two feet too short.

The benefit is that it's much easier to maintain and also increases privacy over the "blending in" approach. With trying to make your fingerprint similar to others, there are always going to be things that you miss that do actually make you uniquely identifiable. Certain things also aren't practical to "blend".

Think about a real life analogy. If you try and blend in with a crowd, even if you do it really well, a sufficiently sophisticated observer will still be able to spot you.

With a randomisation strategy you acknowledge that you will never be able to perfectly blend in and thus allow yourself to stand out. Trackers can build up a profile using that fingerprint. But as soon as your fingerprint changes you are completely unique again.

If you are in a crowd an observer can track you, but next time you appear you appear as someone completely different and thus lose the tail.

Where do the EFF recommend randomisation? From the EFF's surveillance self defence course.

This can be an effective method for breaking persistence, but it is important to note that a tracker may be able to determine that a randomization tool is being used, which can itself be a fingerprinting characteristic. Careful thought has to go into how randomizing fingerprinting characteristics will or will not be effective in combating trackers.

They don't directly recommend either... But then on https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/learn

In practice, the most realistic protection currently available is the Tor Browser, which has put a lot of effort into reducing browser fingerprintability. For day-to-day use, the best options are to run tools like Privacy Badger or Disconnect that will block some (but unfortunately not all) of the domains that try to perform fingerprinting, and/or to use a tool like NoScript( for Firefox), which greatly reduces the amount of data available to fingerprinters.

So the EFF seem to recommend generic over randomisation...

Maybe ask yourself why the Tor project decided against randomisation?