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cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/1751797

Local government debt is estimated at up to $11 trillion, including what's owed by local government financing entities that are “off balance sheet,” or not included in official estimates. More than 300 reforms the party has outlined include promises to better monitor and manage local debt, one of the biggest risks in China’s financial system.

That will be easier said than done, and experts question how thoroughly the party will follow through on its pledges to improve the tax regime and better balance control of government revenues.

“They are not grappling with existing local debt problems, nor the constraints on fiscal capacity,” said Logan Wright of the Rhodium Group, an independent research firm. “Changing central and local revenue sharing and expenditure responsibilities is notable but they have promised this before.”

The scramble to collect long overdue taxes shows the urgency of the problems.

Chinese food and beverage conglomerate VV Food & Beverage reported in June it was hit with an 85 million yuan ($12 million) bill for taxes dating back as far as 30 years ago. Zangge Mining, based in western China, said it got two bills totaling 668 million RMB ($92 million) for taxes dating to 20 years earlier.

Local governments have long been squeezed for cash since the central government controls most tax revenue, allotting a limited amount to local governments that pay about 80% of expenditures such as salaries, social services and investments in infrastructure like roads and schools.

Pressures have been building as the economy slowed and costs piled up from “zero-COVID” policies during the pandemic.

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While housing rescue policies may help provide stimulus to property markets, the economic fundamentals currently unfolding in China are unfavourable to their implementation, writes Yixiao Zhou from The Australian National University.

[...]

China has one of the world’s highest housing price-to-income ratios at 29.59. China also has a low lending interest rate at around 4 per cent. Considering this, the room for expanding the mortgage scale is limited, constraining the ability of easing lending rules to stimulate housing demand.

Another short-term demand factor is the transfer of rural homestead land. In June 2024, Nantong, a city in Jiangsu province, introduced new policies that allow individuals who voluntarily relinquish their rural homesteads and buy homes in urban areas to receive financial subsidies. Nantong is not alone in this initiative. Encouraging the voluntary and compensated relocation from rural homesteads has become a key focus of real estate policies. But this does not seem to have affected the decreasing trend of housing prices either.

[...]

If downward adjustment in property prices leads to real estate loan default, this will pose major risks to financial stability. Japan’s experience with a massive real estate bubble burst in the early 1990s provides a crucial lesson for policymakers in China. The sharp downturn in the real estate sector led to a prolonged period of economic stagnation known as ‘Japan’s lost decade’.

[...]

Ultimately the structural problems holding back demand for properties could be solved by reforms in land allocation, financial market regulation and urbanisation policies. These reforms could help reposition China’s property sector on a healthy and sustainable growth path.

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The appeal of public sector employment in China has reached its highest level in recent decades. The proportion of new graduates preferring state-owned enterprises, government agencies, or public institutions has surged by 22 percentage points, from 51 percent in 2019 to 73 percent in 2024. Conversely, interest in foreign-funded firms and private enterprises has plummeted by a similar margin, from 46 percent to 26 percent.

This shift [...] reflects profound economic and social changes in China. The COVID-19 pandemic has severely impacted service industries, traditionally major employers of young people. Coupled with increasing regulatory burdens, especially in high-tech industries, these factors—against the background of economic downturn—have contributed to a record-high youth unemployment rate, which peaked at over 21 percent in 2023.

In January 2024, the government released revised youth employment data, excluding students, which showed a decrease to 14.9 percent for December 2023. Even with this revised figure, the youth unemployment rate remains alarmingly high—approximately three times the overall unemployment rate in China (5.1 percent).

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The authoritarian China model under President Xi Jinping’s leadership is facing increasing failure.

"Its most critical flaw lies in the unconstrained power of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), arbitrarily intervening in market and social activities for the interest of itself or its leaders without robust mechanisms for accountability and self-correction," writes Chris Lee, a Chinese economist and political strategist.

The China model, in effect, is an institutional system that combines extensive state control and ownership of resources with limited free-market activity, all led by the authoritarian CCP.

[...]

The China model, in effect, is an institutional system that combines extensive state control and ownership of resources with limited free-market activity, all led by the authoritarian CCP.

[...]

Internationally, the China model is more combative, aggressive and expansionist than before. The CCP aims to reshape the world order. It presses on with the Belt and Road Initiative for involvement in foreign economies, establishes its own multilateral organisations and gets involved in geopolitical issues.

[...]

And yet, despite the CCP’s belief in the China model, the Chinese market is losing its dynamism.

The combined market value of private companies, which peaked at US$4.745 trillion in 2021, had fallen below US$2 trillion by the end of 2023.

Foreign direct investment was a mere US$33 billion in 2023, less than 10 percent of the $344 billion reached in 2021 and the lowest level since 1993.

Due to the decline in domestic consumption and investment, the youth unemployment rate has exceeded a critical 15 percent since 2022, and the International Monetary Fund forecasts China’s annual GDP growth will be just 4.6 percent in 2024 and fall to around 3.5 percent by 2028.

The West’s efforts to de-risk their economies, reducing exposure to China in manufacturing and strategic technologies, are exacerbating China’s prospects. China’s rise is losing momentum.

[...]

To restore confidence in the future of China, Xi needs to reduce government intervention in the market and create a level playing field in which SOEs [state-owned enterprises] and private businesses can compete and foreign capital can flow.

The CCP needs to apply the rule of law and relax repression on civil society, thereby freeing the creativity and dynamism of the people. It should abandon ideological antagonism towards Western democracies and re-engage with the outside world. These actions will not undermine the CCP’s legitimacy to govern, which is Xi’s biggest concern. On the contrary, they will strengthen the foundation of its rule, which has been economic success.

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cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/1719125

Archived link

Canadian Defence Minister Bill Blair said security in the Indo-Pacific region was being challenged "in a number of significant and difficult ways" and accused Beijing of trying to reshape the international system to advance its own interests.

Blair, speaking after Vancouver talks with Australian counterpart Richard Marles, said the two nations needed to work more closely together to maintain order in the Indo-Pacific.

The two said they were concerned about what they called Beijing's excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea as well as Chinese military activity around Taiwan.

The Philippines' armed forces and their counterparts from Canada, United States, and Australia this week held joint maritime exercises in the South China Sea.

"Our cooperation is based on seeking to deter. We are absolutely about working with each other so that we can avoid conflict," said Marles, referring to his talks with Blair.

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Taiwan sent a large contingent of athletes to the Olympics this year. Wearing their much-admired uniforms designed by Just In XX — blue for the sky, sea and mountains of Taiwan — they navigated the Seine under a flag showing the team’s permitted name “Chinese Taipei.”

This quadrennial humiliation, a legacy of the unfinished civil war between China’s ruling Communist Party and its predecessor, the Nationalist Party, or KMT, brings home to Taiwan’s twenty-three million people the grim reality of their status as citizens of a country whose name cannot be uttered. Young Taiwanese in Paris were understandably delighted when the French television commentator explained that “Chinese Taipei” would be more familiar to viewers as Taiwan. It was a Lacanian moment: they felt seen.

How Taiwan should be seen, what image it should present to the world, is a question that preoccupies the government in Taipei as it manoeuvres for advantage in the fraught strategic environment of the north Pacific. Jonathan Clement’s Rebel Island, a new short history of Taiwan from antiquity to the present, introduces an English-language readership to how things have come to this pass and what is now at stake.

[Edit typo.]

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Several countries recently cancelled preferential visa treatment for Taiwan passport holders due to pressure from China, the government in Taipei says

A number of countries have decided in recent months to cancel preferential visa treatment for Taiwan passport holders due to pressure from China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) alleged Tuesday.

Botswana, for example, recently changed Taiwan's designation on the drop-down menu on its e-visa application system from "Taiwan" to "China" due to pressure from the People's Republic of China (PRC), MOFA said in a written statement.

The change meant that Taiwan passport holders could no longer apply for an e-visa to Botswana, it said.

Colombia also canceled its visa-free treatment to Taiwan passport holders in 2023. Now, only Taiwanese citizens who also hold United States or Schengen area residency or visas can travel visa-free to Colombia, MOFA said.

Taiwan said it discussed the issue with Colombia before the change, but the South American country insisted on going through with it, and MOFA said it suspected that PRC could be behind the decision, without providing any other details.

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China on Wednesday carried out a combat patrol to test "strike capabilities" near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, a flashpoint area which is within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone.

Beijing has continued to press its claims to almost the entire South China Sea despite an international tribunal ruling that its assertion has no legal basis.

Scarborough Shoal is 240 kilometers (150 miles) west of the Philippines' main island of Luzon and nearly 900 kilometers from the nearest major Chinese land mass of Hainan. The Philippines also refers to Scarborough Shoal as Panatag Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc.

China in 2012 used coastguard vessels to take control of the shoal, a triangular chain of reefs and rocks that are part of a rich fishing ground and had long been used by Filipino fishermen as a safe harbor.

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cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/1654181

Pakistan is once again engulfed in a summer of protests, facing significant social upheaval with ongoing anti-state demonstrations in many areas [...]

The state's response to the current unrest combines longstanding repressive tactics with new approaches [that seem to be] heavily influenced by its subservient and dependent relationship with Beijing. The Pakistani security agencies have adopted new repressive methods to suppress domestic dissent, especially in Balochistan and KPK, areas where Pakistan has upheld a quasi-imperial political structure since the mid-20th century [...]

Pakistan's tactics closely resemble China's longstanding approach to suppressing social unrest, political resistance, and minority groups. Beijing is a symbol of extending authoritarianism into the digital realm through mechanisms such as the 'Great Firewall' and the 'Great Digital Wall of China'.

The Chinese government has created one of the most restrictive media environments worldwide, implementing stringent censorship "to control information in the news, online, and on social media".

Additionally, it has established numerous concentration camps in Xinjiang for the ethno-religious Uyghur Muslim minority. These camps, termed "re-education camps" by the state, hold millions of Uyghurs.

The Chinese government also compels Uyghur women to marry Han Chinese men as part of its effort to suppress this ethnically and religiously distinct minority, which it views as a challenge to its homogenization agenda.

Similarly, cultural assimilation tactics have been employed against Tibetan Buddhists to integrate them into the dominant Han Chinese culture.

Drawing from China's methods to suppress minorities and stifle political dissent, Pakistan's military-dominated establishment [...] has recently sanctioned the creation of a national digital firewall.

This firewall, sourced from China, effectively grants the Pakistani state the authority to regulate social media platforms and restrict citizen access to crucial socio-political sites like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok [which] allows government agencies to trace individual IP addresses, which Pakistani officials label as primary sources of ongoing "anti-state propaganda" [...]

In addition to implementing a nationwide digital firewall, the Pakistani government has also pledged to regulate the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) within the country [...]

This scenario highlights how Pakistan is adopting the repressive tactics of the Chinese state, using them to target Baloch and Pashtun communities, and rendering their struggle invisible while continuing to suppress their calls for an end to ongoing state abuses.

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cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/1637028

Written by Kevin Sheives, Deputy Director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy, and Caitlin Dearing Scott, Director for Countering Foreign Authoritarian Influence at the International Republican Institute.

Beijing’s effort to undermine core democratic values and practices spans the globe and includes: a school in Tanzania where the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] trains members of African political parties; the muzzling of newspaper editors and journalists in Canada, South Africa, and Malaysia; secret pay-to-play deals for PRC-sponsored infrastructure and media projects in Ecuador, Sri Lanka, and the Solomon Islands; the manipulation of university life in Germany, New Zealand, and the United States to limit criticism of the CCP regime and push “positive” views of China; and the use of CCP-affiliated media concerns and business groups to support pro-Beijing political candidates in Australia, Taiwan, and the United States [...]

In this campaign [of the CCP], civil society and the broader nongovernmental sector has come under attack. To eliminate any opposition to CCP rule under Xi Jinping, the CCP has conducted a sustained assault on China’s own civil society. As the world saw in the A4 protest movement in November 2022, a single spark could ignite the underlying frustration that so many Chinese citizens face when denied their basic freedoms. At home, the CCP is bent on curbing social unrest by coopting or targeting civil society [...]

In South Asia, it financed an academic culture that lauded the Belt and Road Initiative and used fear of lost scholarships to make South Asian students in China avoid “controversial” topics. In Kenya, journalists have said that their reporting on a PRC-built railway brought their publications warnings of ad boycotts by PRC-based companies. And among Chinese dissidents abroad or even foreign citizens of Chinese heritage, Freedom House paints a picture of “the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression in the world.” [...]

In an era when public trust in government and other key institutions has declined, civil society can also speak locally and credibly. Civic organizations’ proximity to their constituents is a key component of their local legitimacy, which can make them effective at countering PRC narratives [...]

Advocacy and other civil society activities can also be particularly sensitive to the will of citizens. One Peruvian environmental-advocacy group exposed the negative impact of a PRC company on Amazonian and indigenous areas, activating Peruvian policymakers and even the PRC embassy to address these community vulnerabilities. In Ghana, a consortium of journalists, researchers, and activists exposed Chinese companies’ illegal mining activity. The revelations not only sparked new policy platforms for Ghanaian political parties, but the continued public pressure on Ghanaian law enforcement led to the prosecution of a Chinese national. A Sri Lankan media organization secured greater transparency and access to information for the public by holding public dialogues and conducting investigations of PRC infrastructure projects in the country [...]

The sprawling, full-spectrum influence and engagement campaign that the Chinese Communist party-state is waging around the world requires an equally comprehensive response from civil societies, governments, and economic actors that back democracy. Yet civil societies must not wait for governments to act. In this escalating contest of values across democratic societies, the CCP is clearly not waiting either.

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"It is a dictatorial policy": A former detainee in China's Xinjiang region on her time in prison and Chinese politics

Gulzira Auelhan, a member of a minority group, spent 15 months in a prison in China's Xinjiang region. She was released after her husband and international organizations worked for her rescue. She now lives in the U.S.

Ms. Auelhan speaks about her experience as a prisoner.

Gulzira Auelhan: In the morning, the police and teachers take us from the dormitory to the classroom. In the classroom, we sing songs and, before meals, we sing “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China.” The class content is to study Xi Jinping’s thoughts and party policies. We have 14 hours of political classes daily, with two bathroom breaks. If anyone returns late, the police hit them on the head with electric batons [...]

We also have to write reflections, confessions, and thank-you letters to the Party, along with future plans and thoughts. Each essay must be about four pages long. Since my Chinese is not good, I wrote in Kazakh, and the teacher translated it. Every student reads their essay aloud [...]

If anyone sings [the song, "Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China”] wrong, they are scolded [...]

[The police] physically check phones. In Xinjiang, there is a requirement to report to the police if someone visits your home. If the police find VPNs on visitors’ phones, they detain them [...]

There was a woman [...] in the reeducation center. She was detained for wanting to build a bigger house for her son’s wedding, which the local government considered a complaint. She was paralyzed and in a wheelchair, and I helped her with chores. We formed a close bond [...]

When we first arrived at the reeducation center, 22 women were taken to a women’s and children’s hospital for a full-body examination, including a genital examination. After returning to the reeducation center, we were told we had to get a flu shot after three months due to the risk of spreading diseases. It cost 250 yuan, but I’m unsure if our families or the government paid. We were forced to get the shot; otherwise, we would be transferred to another reeducation center. After the injection, women stopped menstruating and experienced memory loss [...]

After my release, I could contact my husband via WeChat. He urged me to quickly get a passport and leave the country. I was told by officials to lie about losing my passport or being ill for 15 months. I managed to get documents and proof with difficulty before finally leaving for Kazakhstan [...]

My eldest daughter was also detained in 2017 because her passport expired. I only met her after my release.[...]

After my release in October 2018, I wanted to see [my fahter, who lives in Xinjiang], but I was under surveillance. From October 14-17, 2018, Secretary Song forced me to sign a contract to work in a black factory. He assigned me to a glove factory, demanding three months of work for 600 yuan a month before I could return to Kazakhstan. I occasionally returned home but faced restrictions [...]

[In the textile factory in Ili Prefecture where I was forced to work] we were under surveillance, transported by bus from the dormitory to the factory at 4 am Beijing time. We had a few minutes to eat before an hour-long study of Party policies. I had some freedom to use the bathroom, unlike in the classroom. We could use our phones and had Wi-Fi in the factory. We went home on weekends [...]

China has 56 ethnic groups, and it is impossible to categorize them as good or bad. During Deng Xiaoping’s era, the ethnic policies were somewhat better. My grandfather told me that when he was 11 years old during Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, he burned the Quran. Now, the Quran is being used as toilet paper again; history is repeating itself. But I will not blame the Han Chinese people for this. It is a dictatorial policy, formerly Mao Zedong’s dictatorship and now Xi Jinping’s. I hope we can strengthen cooperation regardless of ethnicity or region [...]

I have testified before, including on forced labor issues, and have been working hard to push for legislation against forced labor. I have met with members of [U.S.] Congress. Occasionally, I see products from China in American stores, and it makes me sad. I worry these products might come from forced labor factories, possibly made with others’ tears. I hope Western countries and the international community prioritize human rights over economic interests [...]

A pair of gloves costs ten cents to make in China but sells for 250 yuan abroad. We need stricter policies to sanction these products from China. I hope to shut down these forced labor factories and inhumane prisons, and I want everyone, regardless of ethnicity or region, to be freed [...]

Before coming to the U.S., I thought there were no Chinese products, but I found cheap Chinese goods everywhere after arriving. I worry these goods are from forced labor and need to be sanctioned. I also learned that people use the Temu app to order products, but this is a Chinese-made app, and using similar Chinese apps poses privacy risks, like TikTok. Lastly, I discovered that Xinjiang people in the U.S. tend to use Chinese goods, which is a bad trend.

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China has turned down an International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendation aimed at ending the country's yearslong property market crisis, a move estimated to cost about $1 trillion.

In a report on the Chinese economy, the IMF called for the central government to speed up "completion of unfinished, presold housing, which would help restore homebuyer confidence."

The IMF recommended a comprehensive policy package, partially funded by the central government, to tackle the issue of unfinished presold projects. This approach should be paired with the "timely resolution," or liquidation of insolvent developers, to ensure market stability, the document said.

China's property market, which once accounted for one-fifth of the nation's economic activity, entered a full-blown crisis in 2020 when the government introduced policies targeting speculation and excessive borrowing. Overleveraged real estate giants, including Evergrande and Country Garden, plunged into insolvency. Evergrande was ordered earlier this year to liquidate, while Country Garden faces a similar fate unless it can finalize a debt-restructuring plan by January.

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The original article is gated (requires free registering)

Autocracies and weak democracies import Chinese surveillance AI during times of unrest in pursuit of greater political control, a study by the Prohect Syndicate shows.

Since China has aggressively deployed AI-powered facial recognition to support its own surveillance state, the repirt sets out to explore the patterns and political consequences of trade in these technologies. After constructing a database for global trade in facial recognition AI from 2008 to 2021, the study comprises 1,636 deals from 36 exporting countries to 136 importing countries.

  • Autocracies and weak democracies are more likely to import facial recognition AI from China. While the US predominantly exports the technology to mature democracies (these account for roughly two-thirds of its links, or three-quarters of its deals), China exports roughly equal amounts to mature democracies and autocracies or weak democracies

  • When comparing China’s exports of facial-recognition AI to its exports of other frontier technologies, we found that facial recognition AI is the only technology for which China displays an autocratic bias. Equally notable, we found no such bias when investigating the US.

  • One potential explanation for this difference is that autocracies and weak democracies might be turning specifically to China for surveillance technologies. Autocracies and weak democracies are more likely to import facial recognition AI from China in years when they experience domestic unrest.

  • Imports of Chinese surveillance AI during episodes of domestic unrest are indeed associated with a country’s elections becoming less fair, less peaceful and less credible overall. A similar pattern appears to hold with imports of US surveillance AI, although this finding is less precisely estimated.

  • This suggests a need for tighter AI trade regulation, which could be modeled on the regulation of other goods that produce negative externalities. Insofar as autocratically-biased AI is trained on data collected for the purpose of political repression, it is similar to goods produced from unethically-sourced inputs, such as child labor. Since surveillance AI might have negative downstream externalities, such as lost civil liberties and political rights, it is not unlike pollution.

Similar to all dual-use technologies, facial recognition AI has the potential to benefit consumers and firms. However, regulations must be carefully designed to ensure that this frontier technology is diffused around the world without facilitating autocratization.

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“Aren’t all ethnic groups supposed to be equal? Why, then, is the use of our language, Tibetan, being restricted?” asks a TikTok user who goes by Youga Ga in a video in Mandarin published on the Douyin video platform. The video quickly disappeared from the platform before being republished on other social media sites not censored by the Chinese Communist Party and accessible from abroad.

The Chinese Communist Party has a long history of censoring any political content about Tibetans and other ethnic and religious minorities. At the same time, the Party encourages what might be called cultural content about tourist-friendly things like music, dance and cuisine.

However, in recent weeks, Youga Ga is far from the only person to complain about Douyin’s so-called “ban” on content in the Tibetan language. But like Younga Ga’s video, these posts were quickly removed by the platform.

Douyin hasn’t made a public declaration about banning the Tibetan language, but many posts in Tibetan have been deleted – as have posts about Tibetan culture, according to the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), an NGO based in Dharamsala, India, the seat of the Tibetan government in exile.

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From South America to Africa to the far Pacific, China has been securing access to restricted national fishing grounds by using business partnerships to register its ships under foreign flags — a process known as “flagging in.”

Of the 80 industrial squid-fishing vessels that fly the Argentine flag, 62 are controlled by Chinese companies. In all, China operates at least 249 flagged-in vessels, including ones that fish off the coasts of Micronesia, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Morocco and Iran.

Even before China began putting the flags of other countries on its boats, it reigned supreme in global fishing. It achieved its dominance on the high seas — beyond any country’s jurisdiction — with more than 6,000 distant-water ships, more than triple the size of the next largest national fleet.

The Chinese fleet has a well-documented reputation for violating international laws and standards against overfishing and abusing its crews in the drive to satisfy a growing and unsustainable global appetite for seafood. Amid continuing depletion of the world’s fish stocks, workers on Chinese boats on the high seas have been kept against their will and allowed to die of malnutrition.

The practice of flagging in threatens to make these problems local. In many of the countries China has targeted, governments lack the finances, the coast guard vessels or the political will to board and spot-check fishing ships and enforce the law.

And because seafood is an essential source of protein and fishing provides an important source of employment, experts say the encroachment into national waters by Chinese ships is compromising local food security and jeopardizing local livelihoods.

[...]

China has also displaced fishing vessels from the European Union in the waters of Morocco. In the recent past, dozens of vessels, most of them from Spain, fished with the permission of the Moroccan government. The agreement lapsed in 2023, however, and China now operates at least six flagged-in vessels in Moroccan waters.

And in the Pacific Ocean, Chinese ships comb the waters of Fiji, the Solomon Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, having flagged in or signed access agreements with those countries, according to a 2022 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service. “Chinese fleets are active in waters far from China’s shores,” the report warned, “and the growth in their harvests threatens to worsen the already dire depletion in global fisheries.”

[...]

When Chinese fishing companies buy their way into the national waters of other countries, they are not doing it simply to increase their catch.

China has been expanding its influence in Latin America, Africa and the Pacific — and filling a void left by shrinking U.S. and European investment — through a global development program known as the Belt and Road Initiative. In exchange for well over $100 billion in loans to Latin American governments over the last two decades, China has at times received exclusive access to a wide range of resources including oil fields and lithium mines.

[...]

In May 2021, Sierra Leone signed an agreement with China to build a new fishing harbor and fishmeal processing factory on a beach near a national park. Local organizations pushed for more transparency on the deal, which they said would harm the area’s biodiversity, according to a report by the Stimson Center, a foreign affairs think tank. In April 2022, Sierra Leone began purchasing land to build the harbor, despite opposition from locals.

[...]

In Argentina, China has provided billions of dollars in currency swaps over the last decade, providing a crucial lifeline amid skyrocketing domestic inflation and growing hesitancy from other international investors or lenders. China has also made or promised billion-dollar investments in Argentina’s railway system, hydroelectric dams, lithium mines and solar and wind power plants.

[...]

With this investment [from the Belt and Road Initiative] came political influence ...

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As Pakistan works on enacting economic reforms under a multibillion-dollar IMF bailout, Islamabad must first figure out what to do with its mountain of debt owed to China

After cash-strapped Pakistan secured a new $7 billion (€6.5 billion) bailout package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in July, Islamabad has started talks with Beijing on reprofiling billions in Chinese debt as it seeks to enact economic reforms.

On the table are proposals to delay at least $16 billion in energy sector debt to China, along with extending the term of a $4 billion cash loan facility due to depleting foreign exchange reserves.

Last week, Pakistani Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb was in Beijing to present proposals on extending the maturity of debt for nine power plants built by Chinese companies under the multibillion-dollar Pakistan China Economic Corridor (CPEC).

On Friday, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif told a federal cabinet meeting that he had written a letter to the Chinese government requesting debt reprofiling, Pakistan's Dawn newspaper reported.

Reprofiling debt differs from restructuring debt in that the amount is not cut, rather, the due date for repayment is extended.

Islamabad is under immense pressure to renegotiate the expensive agreements with power producers, primarily Chinese companies, to bring down electricity prices.

Since CPEC was signed in 2015 and became one of largest components of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has poured billions of dollars into developing infrastructure in Pakistan.

The value of CPEC projects comes in a $65 billion, with the primary goal of building a shipping connection for Chinese goods from Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea over the mountain border into China's Xinjiang region.

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China breaks with Latin America and BRICS allies over Venezuela election fraud: Beijing's unquestioning support of the Maduro government is out of step with its ambitions in Latin America

Within minutes of the Maduro government declaring victory in the July 28 Venezuelan elections, China congratulated him on “his successful reelection” and for “the smooth presidential election.” China rushed into its verdict even though according to the government only 80 percent of the results had been reported – meaning at least 2 million more votes were yet to be counted.

China’s reaction has been rejected by all Latin American countries except Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Cuba. China is also at odds with key BRICs partner Brazil and its Belt and Road partners Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Uruguay. The major economic powers in the continent – Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Brazil – have called for evidence of what they deem a fraudulent claim of victory. Even Mexico, famous for staying out of controversies, has asked to see the Electoral Council’s voting records.

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A protest banner appeared on an overpass In Xinhua County, Hunan province, China on Tuesday calling for freedom and democracy. The banner hung over a bridge called for freedom and democracy, criticizing Chinese President Xi Jinping as a “dictator” and an “authoritarian.” The message, translated by British-Chinese journalist Cindi Yu, read: “freedom, democracy, elections, protest school, protest work, protest authoritarian traitor Xi Jinping”.

This act of dissent is unusual in China, where free speech and criticism are heavily suppressed. Protests are often met with a strong response from authorities. Observers say that the emergence of this banner reflects a growing discontent with the CPC’s strict control over public expression, particularly since the implementation of the ‘Zero Covid’ policy. This policy has led to sporadic demonstrations against Xi and the CPC’s governance.

In recent years, there have been several instances of public unrest in China. In October 2022, two banners appeared hung over a busy overpass in the capital Beijing One reads: “Go on strike. Remove dictator and national traitor Xi Jinping.” The other read “Say no to covid test, yes to food. No to lockdown, yes to freedom…Don’t be a slave, be a citizen.”

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Taiwan said it’s having difficulty sending staff to its representative office in Macau because the special administrative region’s government is demanding that they sign a commitment to the “One China Principle” to get a visa.

A Taiwan official who was set to be posted to the Macau, which China resumed sovereignty over in 1999, couldn’t get a visa, Mr Liang Wen-chieh, deputy head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, said at a briefing on Aug 1.

He urged Macau to remove the obstacle and deal with the issue in a friendly manner, but added that Taiwan will “prepare for the worst,” without elaborating.

At issue is Macau’s demand that Taiwan officials commit to the “One China Principle” which states that there is only one China, ruled by the Beijing-based Communist government, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the country. That position is anathema to Taiwan, a democratic and self-ruled island, which argues it has the right of self-determination and that it has never been under the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China.

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**Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of Global Times, the Chinese state-owned newspaper, has reportedly been banned from social media for 30 days, after a now deleted blog post by him argued that China has acknowledged the importance of private economy. **

The former editor-in-chief of the Chinese newspaper, mistakenly argued that absence of the reference to “public ownership remains the mainstay” from the recent Third Plenum Communiqué earlier in July, is an acknowledgment of the capitalist economy, according to Foreign Policy.

Hu is famous for championing China’s aggressive foreign policy – known as wolf-warrior diplomacy – while also known for his opinions on issues, which have been outlandish in the past.

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Cross posted from: https://beehaw.org/post/15297334

Archived version

The Hong Kong Democracy Council (HKDC) and Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) on Tuesday released a new joint report titled “Exporting Repression: Attacks on Protestors During Xi Jinping’s Visit to San Francisco in November 2023”. The report meticulously documents 34 extensive cases of transnational repression (TNR) executed by the supporters of Chinese Communist Party against protestors during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to San Francisco from November 14 to 17, 2023, for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.

  • Spanning 160 pages, the report provides a detailed chronological narrative of the attacks, drawing primarily from interviews and testimonies of 26 protesters and one journalist, most of whom were victims of TNR. It unveils the mobilisation and transportation of Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) united front groups across the US to San Francisco, where they engaged in acts of assault, harassment, and intimidation.

  • This created a pervasive atmosphere of fear and hostility against Tibetans, Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and Chinese democracy activists, including individuals as young as 16 years old, for demonstrating their opposition to Xi and the CCP.

  • The report also scrutinised the response mechanisms of US policymakers and law enforcement authorities at both federal and local levels. “Despite strong awareness of CCP TNR at the federal level and a general commitment to countering it, agencies were unprepared to do so in San Francisco. Local law enforcement authorities exhibited a lack of awareness of TNR, were often unresponsive when alerted to the attacks, and took little and inadequate action in response to the attacks. The result was that protesters were insufficiently protected and perpetrators have not been held accountable,” the report stated.

The report urges the U.S. authorities to investigate whether the united front groups in the U.S. are operating as unregistered foreign agents of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), implementing vetting processes for diplomatic visas issued to PRC applicants, screening for connections to TNR activities, offering protection to groups in the US subjected to TNR, and enacting legislation to create resources to combat TNR.

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